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Some writers simply do not lend themselves to easy analysis. The 
application of concrete theory to their work almost always yields 
unsatisfactory results because it stringently resists generalization 
and categorization. One example of such an author is John Wilmot, 
Second Earl of Rochester, whose enigmatic and seemingly 
contradictory worldview as represented in his poetry is a common 
topic of discussion 





that confronts a student 
of Rochester’s stances 
and values as expressed in his verse” which is that “the mind 
pursues satisfaction through the body;” but “minds are particularly 
unreliable guides and bodies are lamentably fallible” (27). Similarly, 
according to Melissa E. Sanchez, “a neat division between the 
idealism of romance and the cynicism of libertinism is untenable, 
for in Rochester's hands the two thought systems emerge as 
equally artificial attempts to transcend the frustrations that arise 
from humanity's situation between god and beast” (441). It is 
necessarily perplexing for the reader to observe Rochester’s 
attempts to negotiate such paradoxes, leading to critical 
observations like Paul Hammond’s, who claims that “His poetry 
often disturbs … continuity through the fragmentation of experience 
into discrete moments which may be severed from any possible 
narrative by abrupt changes of argument or of register” (49). It 
makes sense then that a body of work lacking narrative continuity 
                                               
1 Dustin Griffin laments the fact that “Freudian analysis is usually 
brought to bear upon literary material in order to uncover hidden or 
disguised fears, anxieties, or obsessions, something the poet himself is 
not conscious of. This is not the case with Rochester. [. . .] Freudian 
analysis can tell us little that Rochester does not tell us himself” (115). 
Interestingly, this does not stop Griffin from attempting a Freudian 
analysis anyway, perhaps due to a lack of any more satisfactory option.  
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can best be analyzed through the application of a theory that 
shares the same fragmented construction. Despite the near 300 
years separating the two authors, Hammond’s description of 
Rochester’s poetry sounds a great deal like Devra Lee Davis’s 
assertion about Theodor Adorno that “His [thought] models are not 
duplicable, system-bound expressions: they are moments, 
expressions, and sketches,” and are arguably “mood betraying.” 
She cites an example of this moodiness in Adorno’s discussion of 
metaphysics in Negative Dialectics, which she describes as an 
“orchestrated cacophony of outrage” (396), as if the author’s mood 
itself were the center of the interpretation, which is then 
“orchestrated” around it.2 
From these critical observations it can be concluded that Rochester 
and Adorno are both notable for an intense authorial presence in 
their writing, revealing inconsistencies that can only come from the 
changeability of an active, individual mind that is not content with 
constructions of abstract theory about life, but also insists on the 
importance of individual experience. As Adorno says, “In the face of 
totalitarian unity, which cries out for the elimination of differences 
directly as meaning, something of the liberating social forces may 
even have converged in the sphere of the individual. Critical theory 
lingers there without a bad conscience” (qtd. in Davis 393). For 
Adorno, theory is only valuable when it considers individual 
difference, which makes his theory an ideal method of approach to 
consider the writing of an individual as unique as the Earl of 
Rochester. Reading Adorno’s collection of aphorisms, Minima 
Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life, alongside a selection of 
Rochester’s poems, I examine intersections in the observations and 
beliefs of Adorno and Rochester—specifically as they are expressed 
in ideas about pleasure and love—and explore the implications of 
                                               
2 The link between Rochester and Adorno is by no means immediately 
obvious. In fact, it derives from my own realization that what I find 
“pleasurable” about reading the work of both authors derives from their 
similar perspectives on the issues discussed here. From that initial 
awareness, I began to see how the work of each could provide a useful 
lens through which to analyze the other.  
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these shared viewpoints as they manifest themselves in 
Rochester’s life and writing. The desired result is to retrieve 
Rochester's work from its often overhasty placement squarely 
within the Libertine tradition, a style of writing characterized by the 
amoral pursuit of physical pleasure in any form. While this aspect 
of the Earl's work deserves consideration, it is also limiting insofar 
as it leaves no room for the exploration of what I believe to be 
moments of deep philosophical contemplation by the poet on his 
own personal despair and his fallen, corrupt society.3 
Reading Rochester's poem alongside Adorno's Minima Moralia 
brings out not only the poet's reflection on his own “damaged life,” 
but also the convergence of the individual and the theoretical in the 
work of both authors. In Minima Moralia, Adorno's objective is “the 
teaching of the good life” (17), which he attempts by supplying 
personal reflections on his own life and experience as “models for a 
future exertion of thought” (18). Adorno's aphorisms are expressed 
in language both poignant and poetic, and there is a sense of loss 
bordering on despair in the writer's view of the world in which he 
has lived; a place where true pleasure and happiness are imagined, 
but never achieved. His description of “A Damaged Life,” though 
based on his individual experience, brings to mind the work of the 
Earl of Rochester because he too observes his world from a position 
on the brink of personal despair. Adorno and Rochester have 
similar ideas about the possibility of experiencing true and lasting 
pleasure, which is best defined as a sustained feeling of 
contentment, both physical and psychological, that is not tainted by 
the threat of its own disappearance. Therefore, Rochester's poems 
should, like Minima Moralia, be read as “models for a future 
exertion of thought,” rather than celebrations of rampant lust and 
debauchery that have no philosophical bearing outside their 
                                               
3 Nicholas Fisher and Matt Jenkinson's 2007 “Rochester and the Specter 
of Libertinism” draws attention to the considerable political power of the 
Earl in his lifetime (particularly as a memorable satirical voice). Yet, it is 
again his anger and aggression that is highlighted, rather than his 
capacity for inactive contemplation and philosophical expression.  
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historical context. The comparison of these authors is done 
somewhat self-consciously, however, with the acknowledgment 
that to present the argument that Adorno provides a much-needed 
theoretical context in which to place the poems of Rochester is an 
endeavour that might not meet with the approval of Adorno 
himself, who believes that “He who seeks to mediate between two 
bold thinkers … stamps himself as mediocre: he has not the eyes to 
see uniqueness: to perceive resemblances everywhere, making 
everything alike, is a sign of weak eyesight” (74). 
Pleasure, for Adorno as well as for Rochester, is, as it stands, 
fleeting and unfulfilling. According to Adorno, “the transience of 
pleasure … attests that except in the minutes heurueses, when the 
lover’s forgotten life shines back in the loved one’s limbs there is, 
as yet, no pleasure at all” (176). This idea of reflection is crucial to 
Adorno’s concept of pleasure, which he sees as an impossibility in 
what Thomas Pepper calls “that fallen state of commodity 
fetishism” (924) where people are more often than not reduced to 
the status of objects. Adorno suggests that the capacity for 
happiness relies on “the unrestricted openness to experience 
amounting to self-abandonment in which the vanquished 
rediscovers himself” (200), and the only way to accomplish that 
rediscovery is through the recognition of the self in the other. He 
defines “the secret of sensuality itself” to be that, we find that the 
moment “[i]n the fixity of its gaze, until self-reflection dawns, is the 
very anonymity, the unhappy generality, that is fatefully 
reproduced in its negative, the unfettered sovereignty of thought” 
(90). Real pleasure, which is different from momentary sexual 
stimulation, is impossible to achieve in general. It relies on a 
specific connection with the other that can only be achieved 
through recognition of his or her individuality, since, as Pepper 
explains, “the monad is a mirror and a window—in relation to its 
complement” (923). Self-recognition in the other prevents the 
impulse to objectify that person, making him or her into a 
commodity with which one can have no special relationship 
because he or she is inherently different. Even if both partners 
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were being objectified by the other, in a situation like Adorno 
describes when “Sex, as an immediate craving, makes everything 
an object of action and therewith equal” (89), the relationship 
between equal objects is one of constant and arbitrary exchange, 
from which the commodities can derive no real pleasure. So while 
Adorno believes that “the experience of pleasure presupposes a 
limitless readiness to throw oneself away” (91), it is clear that this 
self-abandonment is for the purpose of retrieving the self as an 
image reflected in the specific “limbs” of the other. 
An example of the changeability of thought of which Davis accuses 
Adorno can be seen in the fact that there is another, possibly 
contradictory, image of pleasure presented in Minima Moralia. In 
“This Side of the Pleasure Principle,” Adorno attacks Freud because 
his “unenlightened enlightenment plays into the hands of bourgeois 
disillusion. … Reason is for him a mere superstructure … because 
he rejects the end, remote to meaning, impervious to reason, 
which alone could prove the means, reason, to be reasonable: 
pleasure” (60-1). So far, so good: the idea that pleasure is a 
reasonable end in itself is too full of common sense to be 
contradictory. However, Adorno continues on to say that: “He alone 
who could situate utopia in blind somatic pleasure, which, satisfying 
the ultimate intention, is intentionless, has a stable and valid idea 
of truth” (61). This definition of true pleasure has a lot in common 
with the first; however, it is the “blindness” of this second pleasure 
that is troubling, given the importance placed on wide-eyed self-
recognition of one’s image in the other to achieving true happiness 
described in the first example. Does not “blind somatic pleasure” 
necessarily imply a general anonymity, since recognition is 
impossible when one’s eyes are closed? Reconciliation of this 
contradiction is possible if the blindness Adorno proposes is taken 
to mean blindness to “intention.” In other words, this simply adds 
to the idea that pleasure should be an end in itself, thus 
strengthening one’s ability to recognize oneself in the other by 
avoiding the distraction of outside motivations or agendas. The 
“somatic pleasure” Adorno describes is only blind to things outside 
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the specific subject of one’s contemplation. His criticism of Freud 
makes sense when considering the objective of Freudian analysis to 
uncover the repressed motivations of human action. Adorno is 
arguing that the pursuit of pleasure as an end in itself is empty of 
these repressed elements because it is an ultimate recognition of 
the self in the other. Blind somatic pleasure is “remote to meaning” 
because it is individual and therefore it rejects any attempt at 
totalization through insertion into psychoanalytical categories. By 
experiencing true pleasure, a person experiences him or herself 
completely, and nothing is repressed. 
For the Earl of Rochester, pleasure is something that is ever 
pursued and never achieved. He seems to share Adorno’s view that 
the only reasonable end to reason is pleasure, and would agree 
that thinking about pleasure turns it into an object, and therefore 
takes away the ability to experience it: 
I own right reason, which I would obey; 
That Reason which distinguishes by Sense, 
And gives us Rules of Good and Ill from thence: 
That bounds Desires with a Reforming Will, 
To keep them more in vigour, not to kill. 
Your Reason hinders, mine helps to enjoy, 
Renewing appetites yours would destroy, 
My Reason is my friend, Yours is a cheat, 
Hunger calls out, my Reason bids me eat; 
Perversely yours your appetites does mock, 
They ask for food, that answers what’s a clock. (“Satyre 
Against Reason and Mankind” 99-109) 
The response of Rochester’s “right” reason to hunger is to eat, 
while reason that recognizes an objective order would wait until the 
appropriate time to eat, thereby making its end the conformity to 
an imposed plan rather than pleasure. The way that Rochester’s 
reason “distinguishes by Sense” and “bounds Desires” in order to 
“keep them more in vigour” is based on the same principle as 
Adorno’s insistence on the specificity of pleasure. In both cases 
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action must be taken without thought, the satisfaction of desire 
must be immediate in order for it to be free from thought’s 
objectification. In fact, Adorno also uses the image of hunger to 
outline his argument when he states that the only “goal of an 
emancipated society” that reveals any “tenderness” is “the coarsest 
demand: that no-one shall go hungry any more” (155-6). Any 
demand beyond that is the instrument of an imposed system. 
Although Rochester reveals an understanding of the kind of reason 
necessary to achieve pleasure, many of his poems reflect an 
inability to apply this method to his own experience.4 The trouble is 
that he does not draw a line between unfettered action and 
impulse. His reason does not simply bid him eat, it bids him gorge 
himself on the kind of arbitrary pleasure-seeking that Adorno 
condemns for its “anonymity” and “unhappy generality.” This 
surfeit of wanton impulse is particularly evident in the poem “The 
Imperfect Enjoyment.” The first few lines suggest the possibility for 
the true pleasure of identification and self-reflection in the other: 
Naked she lay clasp’d in my longing Armes, 
I fill’d with Love and she all over Charmes, 
Both equally inspir’d with eager fire, 
Melting through kindness, flameing in desire. 
With Armes, Leggs, Lipps, close clinging to embrace 
She clipps me to her breast and sucks me to her face. (1-6) 
The image presented is one of lovers so entwined that they are 
almost indistinguishable. They are “melting” together, a collection 
of limbs “equally inspired.” The speaker recognizes his lover as an 
individual with specific “Charmes,” who is also a reflection of him in 
that he recognizes his own “eager fire” in her as well. Their 
connection seems to be one of “true affection” as Adorno defines it: 
“one that speaks specifically to the other, and becomes attached to 
                                               
4 Although it is always important to recognize the distinction between a 
writer’s life and his work, it is generally believed that, in Rochester’s 
case, there is a strong autobiographical element to most of his writing. 
Griffin observes that “his songs are intensely personal” (115), a claim I 
would extend to the bulk of his poetry.  
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beloved features and not to the idol of personality, the reflected 
image of possession” (79). In these lines, the woman is able to be 
both the reflection of the speaker and an autonomous individual 
because her charms, limbs, and actions are still and specifically 
hers. However, this attempt at “true affection” is not sustained: 
Her nimble tongue (loves lesser lightning) plaied 
Within my Mouth; and to my thoughts conveyd 
Swift Orders, that I should prepare to throw 
The all dissolving Thunderbolt beloe. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
But whilst her buisy hand would guide that part 
Which shou’d convey my soul up to her heart 
In liquid raptures I dissolve all o’er, 
Melt into sperm and spend at every pore. 
A touch from any part of her had don’t: 
Her hand, her foot, her very look’s a Cunt. (7-11, 13-18) 
At the precise moment when Adorno’s image of “the minutes 
heurueses, when the lover’s forgotten life shines back in the loved 
one’s limbs” might have taken place, the intimacy of the couple is 
violently shattered and the speaker melts, not into the woman, but 
into the proof of his own failed attempt at pleasure. Consequently, 
once the connection is broken, the woman is immediately turned 
into an object by the speaker’s generalization of all her parts into 
one category. Everything that was once specific about her is now 
subsumed under the name of “Cunt.” The speaker’s premature 
ejaculation is distressing to the woman, and as she “from her body 
wipes the clamy Joyes” (20) she asks him, “All this to Love, and 
Raptures due-- / Must we not pay a Debt to pleasure too?” (23-4). 
Her language reveals an understanding of the difference between 
instant sexual gratification (rapture/orgasm) and true pleasure, 
which requires some sort of investment, the paying of a “debt.” 
The “clamy Joyes” are a necessary part of “Love and Raptures;” 
but in this case, things have gone awry because real pleasure has 
been sacrificed for one-sided sexual gratification. Despite her 
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seemingly superior understanding, the woman’s use of the word 
“debt” is problematic, because it suggests that she too is under the 
spell of commodity fetishism, since she finds the language of 
commerce unavoidable.5 As Adorno says, “Loving means not letting 
immediacy wither under the omnipresent weight of mediation and 
economics” (110). “Immediacy” here must be taken to mean 
closeness, rather than quickness. Rochester quite literally withers 
under this pressure, revealing the mediation of his experience 
through the use of images of lightening and thunderbolts to replace 
the physical features of the lovers. They are no longer limbs, but 
are nonspecific forces of nature. Also, the experience takes on the 
language of an economic transaction with the use of the word 
“spend” to describe the speaker’s uncontrolled action. The rest of 
the poem all but forgets about the woman, becoming a frustrated 
attack by the speaker on his “Dart of Love” (37) that “Breaks every 
stew, does each smale whore invade, / But when great Love the 
onsett does Command, / Base recreant to thy Prince, thou durst 
not stand” (59-61). Under the pressure of habit induced by 
arbitrary indulgence of impulse, the immediacy of sexual 
gratification is irreconcilable with the longevity necessary for the 
achievement of true pleasure with a specific and individual partner. 
The speaker reveals the same kind of “inhibition, impotence, [and] 
sterility of the never changing” that Adorno lists as characteristic of 
a “bourgeois society” (156) under the control of commodity 
fetishism. 
Another “omnipresent weight” imposed on society according to 
Adorno is what he calls the “abstract temporal sequence” which 
“plays in reality the part one would like to ascribe to the hierarchy 
of feelings” (78). This inevitable march of time is “irreversible” 
(78), and is not a product of commodity fetishism, but is its source: 
“In fact, it is the matter of this already announced abstract 
sequencing operation itself, structurally unavoidable, that is 
                                               
5 The terminology is, of course, anachronistic. But members of 
Restoration society would have had no trouble understanding sexual 
gratification's potential to function as a system of commercial exchange. 
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precisely the explanation for why commodity production is 
inevitable” (Pepper 924). The “hierarchy of feelings” is thus 
replaced by “the notion of time” that “is itself formed on the basis 
of the order of ownership” (79). In other words, our relationships 
with other people are dictated by the order in which we meet them, 
and since time is only understood through the order of ownership, 
a partner is reduced to an object through “possessiveness” which 
“loses its hold on its object precisely through turning it into an 
object, and forfeits the person whom it debases to ‘mine’” (79). 
Once the abstract label “mine” is used, the person who it is meant 
to describe becomes an object, and is therefore replaceable and 
indistinct. How can one sustain love, then? Again, the answer is 
timing: “One might almost say that truth itself depends on the 
tempo, the patience and perseverance of lingering with the 
particular” (77). We have already seen that, for Adorno, specificity 
is key to true affection. As he puts it—somewhat paradoxically—in 
the section of Minima Moralia titled “For Anatole France,” “The 
universality of beauty can communicate itself to the subject in no 
other way than in obsession with the particular” (76). Experiencing 
the “universality of beauty” in the contemplation of a person’s 
particular qualities can be nothing other than true love. He 
continues on to explain that it is a selfish, yet necessary, attribute 
of love that one must submit to the “injustice of contemplation,”6 
which involves an insistence on the part of the lover to focus only 
on the specific attributes of the other despite the fact that “No gaze 
attains beauty that is not accompanied by indifference, indeed 
almost by contempt, for all that lies outside the object 
                                               
6 Thomas Pepper makes a somewhat offhand comment that the “fallen 
state of commodity fetishism” is “Adorno’s supposedly secular equivalent 
for Pascal’s state of Man’s Fallenness” (924). It seems in fact that 
Adorno and Pascal have similar views on a number of subjects, reflected 
here in Pascal’s statement that: “It is untrue that we are worthy to be 
loved [preferentially] by others. It is unfair that we should want such a 
thing. … We are born unfair” (qtd. in Kreeft 156-7). Both men would 
agree that there is something both wrong and unavoidable in the desire 
for preferential (and therefore specific) love.  
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contemplated” (77).7 Once that indifference ceases to exist, “if the 
particular is startled from its rapture,8 interchanged and weighed 
up, the just overall view makes its own the universal injustice that 
lies in exchangeability and substitution” (76). So, time will march 
on, but it is possible for love to withstand the order of ownership as 
long as the lovers keep their eyes on the particular attributes of the 
beloved, and not on the abstract movement of the clock’s hands, or 
the distracting smiles of anonymous passers-by. 
Rochester also recognizes the pressure imposed by the abstract 
temporal sequence. In his poem “Love and Life” he contemplates 
the passing of time and also admits that he is incapable of the 
“injustice of contemplation” necessary to resist it: 
All my past Life is mine no more, 
The flyeing hours are gone 
Like Transitory dreams given o’re 
Whose Images are kept in store 
By memory alone. 
What ever is to come is not: 
How can it then be Mine? 
The present moment’s all my Lott 
And that as fast as it is got 
Phillis is wholly thine. 
Then talk not of Inconstancy, 
False hearts and broken vows: 
                                               
7 Although Adorno is technically talking about beauty, not love, he uses 
similar language to describe them, as we can see, and so I think it is 
safe to draw the conclusion that Adorno’s understanding of beauty and 
his understanding of love are based on the same principles. Also, the 
placement of “For Anatole France” and “Morality and Temporal 
Sequence” back-to-back in the book contributes to the idea that Adorno 
might have seen a connection between the two, or at least that they are 
products of the same “mood.”  
8 This is, of course, a different kind of rapture than the one referred to 
by the woman in “The Imperfect Enjoyment.” In this context, it has little 
to do with the sexual gratification she is describing, but is rather used to 
indicate intense concentration on the other.  
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If I by miracle can be 
This livelong Minute true to Thee 
Tis’ all that Heaven allowes. (1-15) 
The speaker of this poem presents himself as a victim of the 
passing of time. He is unable to control any moment but the 
precise present, which he turns into an object and gives away, 
thereby ensuring that it will be replaced by another moment, which 
he can then give to whatever abstract lover is then present. His 
question, “What ever is to come is not: / How can it then be mine?” 
confirms Adorno’s assertion that “whatever is, is experienced in 
relation to its possible non-being” (79). Inconstancy is here 
meaningless because the speaker has given Phillis all he can give; 
the present moment, which will soon become part of his past life 
that he can no longer lay claim to as something that belongs in the 
category of “mine.” Rochester would certainly agree that “nothing 
past is proof, through its translation into mere imagination, against 
the curse of the empirical present” (Adorno 166). His passivity in 
the face of time’s progress suggests that this speaker will never 
achieve true love because he makes no resistance to the surrender 
of one moment to the next. For him, the false wisdom Adorno 
warns against is potentially true: “they are all only people, which 
one it is does not really matter” (79-80). 
This poem brings up an interesting discontinuity between the 
beliefs of Adorno and Rochester; namely, their observations about 
memory. Rochester is able to let go of moments dispassionately, 
committing them to memory that is unaffected by the present. This 
is made clear through the very structure of “Love and Life,” which 
is episodic; each period of past, future, and present is contained in 
its own stanza. The past is “mine no more” and “gone.” It is “kept 
in store by memory,” which suggests that the speaker has no 
access to it. However, for Adorno, memory allows the present to 
affect the past: “The most blissful memory of a person can be 
revoked in its very substance by later experience. He who has 
loved and who betrays love does harm not only to the image of the 
 43 
Pivot 2.1 
past, but to the past itself” (166). For Adorno, the past is never 
gone or stored away, but is always susceptible to corruption by the 
present. When a lover gives in to the pressures of exchangeability, 
he or she does real damage to the past: “[S]omeone ousted by a 
newcomer is always misused, a shared past life annulled, 
experience itself deleted” (78). This is precisely why the past is 
inaccessible for Rochester, his experience of love and time is based 
on the idea that every moment, every woman, is “ousted” into the 
vault of memory, essentially “annulled” and “deleted.” Rochester is 
incapable of experiencing the kind of love Adorno defines as true. 
While the Earl may understand that the passage of time works 
against the ability to experience true love, he evokes a sort of 
cynical and defeated rejection of the possibility of resisting the 
abstract temporal sequence. Instead of actively seeking love, he 
buries himself in hedonistic pursuits in an attempt to find diversion 
in the constant exchange of arbitrary moments. What sets Adorno 
apart from Rochester is that he seems still to believe in the 
prospect of love, and he recognizes the unavoidable connection of 
moments and the violence that comes from ignoring the past. 
Another of Rochester’s poems that addresses the relationship 
between love and time is the song that begins “Absent From Thee I 
Languish Still”: 
1 
Absent from thee I languish still 
Then ask me not when I return, 
The straying fool twill plainly kill 
To wish all day, all night to mourn. 
2 
Dear from thine arms then let me fly 
That my fantastick mind may prove, 
The torments it deserves to try 
That Tears my fixt heart from my love. 
3 
When weary’d with a world of woe 
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To thy safe bosome I retire 
Where love and peace and truth doe flow, 
May I contented there Expire 
4 
Least once more wandring from that heav’n 
I fall on some Base heart unbles’d, 
Faithless to thee, false, unforgiv’n 
And loose my everlasting rest. (1-16) 
Again we are presented with a speaker who is helpless against the 
compulsion of exchange. Time is for him a malevolent force that 
draws him away from his lover and will not even allow him the 
power to control when he may return. Even though he recognizes 
the difference between this woman’s specific “safe bosome” and 
the general “Base heart,” he is unable to concentrate on his love. 
He is distracted by his “fantastick mind” that “tears” him from the 
necessary contemplation of her alone. Marianne Thormählen sums 
up the problem nicely when she explains that “his mind possesses 
no power to keep him off certain misery, and it is obviously unlikely 
ever to gain any such strength; in other words, only death can stop 
his straying” (25). The only way for Rochester to be free from the 
danger of submitting to exchangeability is by choosing to die in the 
woman’s “safe bosome.” Adorno also discusses the reasoning 
behind “freely chosen death” where “freedom has contracted to 
pure negativity,” and the choice to die represents nothing more 
than “the wish to curtail the infinite abasement of living and the 
infinite torment of dying, in a world where there are far worse 
things to fear than death” (38). It seems that what is at stake for 
Rochester is certainly worse than death, since to continue living 
would be to risk the loss of his “everlasting rest.” To be absent 
from the woman is to languish in wishes and mourning that are 
killing him anyway in a slow and tormenting deterioration, so the 
only freedom available to him is to choose to die in her arms, 
where he can at least be safe and contented. His true desires are 
frustrated by the abstract temporal sequence which he is unable to 
 45 
Pivot 2.1 
resist, so the speaker wishes for the only means of escape of which 
he can conceive: death. However, the line “May I contented there 
Expire” suggests that he is still wishing, not choosing. It is 
interesting that, for all his inability to resist inconstancy, the 
speaker does not seem to consider the possibility that the woman 
might not want him after his repeated infidelities. So, constancy is 
possible, just not for him.9 
Just as freedom can only be expressed through a negative action, 
pleasure too is subject to perversion by the negative, as Adorno 
shows in the form the experience of pleasure takes on in “Tough 
Baby.” Adorno describes a group he calls “He-men” (46), who 
display “a certain gesture of virility” that “expresses independence, 
sureness of the power to command, [and] the tacit complicity of all 
males” (45). He finds this confident gesture suspicious, and goes 
on to explain that “the pleasures of such men … all have about 
them a latent violence” (46); but while this violence may seem to 
be directed at others, it is in fact directed at the self because these 
men are all masochists who believe that “all pleasure has, 
preserved within it, earlier pain,” and for them the “pride in bearing 
it, is raised directly, untransformed, … to pleasure” (46). The 
exclusivity of this group relies on the lie of their sadism, that the 
pleasure sadism gives them is perversely rooted in their own 
suffering, a fact that allows them to become “agents of repression” 
(46). However, Adorno reveals this lie to be “nothing other than 
repressed homosexuality presenting itself as the only approved 
form of heterosexuality” (46). By excluding everyone, male or 
female, from their “club,” the He-men create a generalized group of 
the Other that includes “the compliant [male] youth” as an object 
belonging to the same category as women. Thus, Adorno concludes 
that “Totalitarianism and homosexuality belong together” (46). A 
                                               
9 Perhaps this double standard is simply based on the fact that a woman 
would not have the same choices as a man during this period. Her life 
would be lived in the private sphere of the home, while the speaker is 
necessarily drawn into the public sphere, and therefore exposed to 
considerably more frequent temptation. 
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sexualized totalization means that every Other since not part of the 
club, is a potential object for sexual domination, and is essentially 
genderless because defined only through membership in the 
category of Other. 
Although it is hard to imagine the Earl of Rochester being described 
as a “He-man,” there is certainly something of that “latent 
violence” in him, which can be seen in occasions like the lengthy 
attack he makes on his own impotence in “The Imperfect 
Enjoyment,” since it only comes out when his ability to dominate 
sexually is threatened. This poem also shows that he is not afraid 
to make an exuberant “gesture of virility,” which manifests itself in 
his excessive bragging about past sexual conquests. This bragging 
also contains a reference to sexual encounters with males: “Stiffly 
Resolv’d t’would Carelessly invade / Woman, nor Man, nor ought its 
fury stayd- / Where ere it pierc’d a Cunt it found or made” (41-3). 
Arbitrary sex threatens to be an act of violent domination, or 
furious invasion, but use of the word “careless” makes the violence 
latent. The speaker faces no opposition from woman or man, every 
object is willingly subsumed under the category of “Cunt,” so there 
is no need for violent domination. Paul Hammond offers an 
interpretation of these lines that supports the idea of the sexual 
object as a generalized and genderless Other, arguing that “[t]he 
casual phrasing suggests that the gender of the partner is 
immaterial, though at the same time … makes it clear that the 
male body is no more than a convenient substitute for the female. 
There is in fact no trace here of homoeroticism, no real 
responsiveness to the sexual attractions of the male body” (55). 
Although Hammond is right that these lines do not reveal an 
attraction to the male body specifically, I do not believe it is seen 
as a substitute for the female, either. There is no evidence of a 
preference for the specifically female, since “Cunt” as a category is 
something that “Woman,” “Man,” and “ought” else can be “made” 
into. A woman’s anatomical structure is not what places her in that 
category, and the very anonymity of her place within it negates the 
possibility of preference. Like the “compliant youths” Adorno 
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describes, women are there simply due to their general 
acquiescence to domination by the “He-men.” 
Rochester again displays a tendency towards “He-man” exclusivity 
and totalizing sexuality in “Love to a Woman,” where he proclaims: 
Farewell Woman—I entend 
Henceforth every Night to sitt 
With my lewd well natur’d Friend 
Drinking to engender witt. 
Then give me health, wealth, Mirth, and wine, 
And if buizy Love intrenches 
There’s a sweet soft Page of mine 
Can doe the Trick worth Forty wenches. (9-16) 
These lines separate the speaker’s world into two groups. One can 
be described in Adorno’s words as belonging to “the club, that 
arena of a respect founded on scrupulous unscrupulousness” (46). 
The other is, just that, the Other, a category occupied by the 
“sweet soft Page” (or “compliant youth”), and “wenches,” who are 
all equal in the sense that they are available as sexual objects. 
Though these lines might appear to suggest an actual preference 
for the male sexual object, the fact that this Page can “doe the 
Trick worth Forty wenches” is more a result of proximity than 
attraction. In the words of Thomas Hobbes: “Felicity is a continual 
progress of the desire, from one object to another; … the object of 
mans desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; 
but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire” (qtd. in 
Wilcoxon 196). Arguably, it would be much easier to arrange a 
sexual encounter with the boy who, as a page, would be under the 
speaker’s employ and in his vicinity most of the time. Arranging for 
“forty wenches” would certainly be more difficult, and might draw 
the speaker away from his “lewd well natur’d Friend” for longer 
than necessary. And why bother when “After all, they are all only 
people, which one it is does not really matter” (Adorno 79-80)? The 
page is not more attractive, just more convenient; the most 
reliable source for the continued “felicity” of the speaker. 
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Despite his crudeness and misogyny, the speaker of “Love to a 
Woman” is aware of what it takes to find true love and pleasure. As 
we have seen, it is in fact a trend among Rochester’s speakers to 
be able to recognize the self-destruction they are nonetheless 
powerless to avoid. In this poem, the speaker's compulsion to find 
satisfaction from a number of specific places, and not from a 
totality, reveals the correct form for happiness, but the wrong 
content. He “becomes attached to beloved features” (Adorno 79), 
but those features come from multiple places (his page and his 
friend), not belonging to one specific other. For him, “buizy Love” is 
separate from the companionship he finds with his friend; it is 
“buizy” and distracting. It can be satisfied temporarily by his “sweet 
soft page,” but will continue to “intrench” upon the only lasting 
satisfaction he can find, which is with his friend with whom he 
intends “Henceforth every Night to sitt.” This fragmented happiness 
is self-defeating because the speaker must continue to move back 
and forth between the two forms of pleasure he identifies as 
mutually exclusive. While he is in some sense making a choice 
here, it is not a free choice because he is still subject to the 
“abstract temporal sequence” that dictates when lust will draw him 
from his “health, wealth, Mirth, and wine.” Rochester’s speaker is 
caught somewhere between the “true affection” and “He-man” club 
mentality described by Adorno. Characteristically unwilling to be 
characterized, he resists inclusion in any sort of pre-fabricated 
categories, even those of a man who himself rejects the totalizing 
impulses of concrete theory. 
Reading Rochester’s poems through the lens of Adorno’s theories 
on love and pleasure in Minima Moralia highlights just how elusive 
an author the Earl can be. He identifies the principles of true love 
and happiness, but in what Adorno describes as the “fallen world of 
commodity fetishism,” the Earl is powerless to achieve these 
pleasures. He is the sort of subject who requires the time careful 
contemplate takes, one who must be loved for his specific parts 
that are both a reflection of ourselves and proof of his uniqueness. 
The intensely autobiographical nature of his poetry celebrates the 
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individuality of a real and complicated person who struggles with 
the endless contradiction between what should be and what is. Like 
Adorno, Rochester is subject to changes in mood and outlook, 
moving from expressions of extreme tenderness to those of 
extreme rage in a matter of lines, thereby fervently resisting the 
critic and theorist’s urge to totalize. When Alex Thomson explains 
that “Adorno protests that this act of knowing is violent, in equating 
individual and particular objects, by imposing subjective categories 
on them” (110), he is reminding us that it is useless to try to 
“know” an author like the Earl of Rochester or Theodor Adorno, but 
it is certainly both pleasurable and fulfilling to take the time to 
appreciate each author in all his complexity. The apparent 
fragmentation of Adorno and Rochester’s works is a necessary 
consequence of their autobiographical nature, and while these two 
“bold thinkers” certainly share some insights into the truth about 
pleasure and love, they also make it impossible to “perceive 
resemblances everywhere” (Adorno 74), because their reactions to 
this truth are quite different, and perhaps even “mood 
betraying.”  
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